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The Administrative Procedure Act2 (APA) has traditionally been con-
sidered to contain "generous [judicial] review provisions." 3 Even the pro-
hibitions to the availability of judicial review contained in section 701(a)4
were construed to give rise to a presumption of reviewability.5 Contrary to
this tradition, in Heckler v. Chaney the United States Supreme Court held
that an agency's decision not to use its enforcement powers was presumptively
unreviewable. 6 This Note discusses the presumption of unreviewability and
its impact on the availability of judicial review in agency inaction cases.
In Heckler v. Chaney, the respondents petitioned the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to use its enforcement powers to prevent the use of
certain drugs to carry out capital punishment under the lethal injection laws
1. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). The Chaney decision has been cited in over twenty
cases since it was handed down. Among these, the following are most helpful: Scher-
ing Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court noted that case was
"on all fours with Heckler v. Chaney" and held that FDA decision not to pursue
its enforcement activities in the "new animal drug" area was unreviewable); Elec-
tricities of North Carolina v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th
Cir. 1985) (court held unreviewable Southeastern Power Administration marketing
decision concerning distribution of electric power); Cardoza v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1543, 1549 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguished Chaney as adding
to list of agency actions unsuitable for judicial review "the class of agency nonen-
forcement decisions"); Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (This
case was on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Chaney.
The court on remand held the Department of Justice's decision not to provide counsel
was unreviewable.), reh'g denied, 783 F.2d 252, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3319 (1986);
Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1985) (excellent discussion of Chaney
and its impact on the traditional section 701(a)(2) analysis).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 611-706 (1982).
3. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
5. See, e.g., Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd,
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
6. 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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of Texas and Oklahoma. 7 The FDA had refused to use its enforcement powers
because the respondents' petition did not present the serious societal threat
which is generally required to warrant the use of the agency's enforcement
powers.8 The FDA supported its position by citing the agency's "inherent
discretion to decline to pursue certain enforcement matters." 9
The respondents filed suit in district court to compel the FDA to carry
out its statutory responsibilities. 0 The district court granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of the FDA stating, "[D]ecisions of executive departments and
agencies to refrain from instituting investigations and enforcement proceed-
ings are essentially unreviewable by the courts."" On appeal of this ruling,
the appellate court reversed the lower court.' 2 The appellate court noted that
prosecutorial discretion is not a "magical incantation which automatically
provides a shield for arbitrariness."' 3 Citing a growing trend favoring judicial
review, the appellate court held that the agency's decision was presumptively
reviewable. 14 Because nothing in the case rebutted this presumption, the court
vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded the case to the district court
for review."
The FDA appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court.
The question presented to the Chaney Court was whether the FDA's exercise
7. Id. at 821. It was respondents' theory that these drugs would not induce
a quick and painless death. Id. at 823. Because these drugs had not been tested or
approved for the use intended by the states, the respondents requested that the FDA
delay the use of these drugs until the Agency approved them as safe and effective
for human execution. Id. at 824.
8. Id. at 824-25. The FDA stated: "Generally, enforcement proceedings in
this area are initiated only when there is a serious danger to public health or a blatant
scheme to defraud. We cannot conclude that those dangers are present under State
lethal injection laws, which are duly authorized statutory enactments in furtherance
of proper State functions .... "Id.
9. Id. at 824.
10. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1178.
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 1188 (citing 2 K. DAvis, ADMnmsT'ATIVE LAW T TISE § 9:6, at
239-40 (2d ed. 1979)). The court stated that in the last twenty years courts have
"frequently forced agencies to implement and enforce their regulatory statutes, or at
least to explain their failure to do so." 718 F.2d at 1187. For a list of cases finding
review was available, see Chaney, 470 U.S. at 850 n.7.
13. 718 F.2d at 1187.
14. Id. at 1187-88.
15. Id. at 1191. The court sent a strong message with its remand. It stated
in the opinion:
Both this court and the District Court must be mindful that endless
litigation ... concerning the sufficiency of the agency's reasons would be
inconsistent with the statute's goal of expeditiously protecting consumers
from the alleged hazards. We must be prepared to compel FDA to take
action with respect to the prayer for relief where an acceptable explanation
of its inaction is not promptly forthcoming.
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of its discretion fell within section 701(a)(2) of the APA and was therefore
unreviewable. 16 The Chaney Court, in answering the question affirmatively,
attempted for the first time to interpret, in detail, section 701(a)(2) of the
APA. 17 Traditionally, section 701(a)(2) has been considered a "very narrow
exception"18 to the availability of judicial review. This exception prohibits
review where an "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."' 19
In Chaney the Court first dealt with the statutory construction problem
presented by section 701(a). 20 This section contains two seemingly overlapping
prohibitions to judicial review. 2' Judicial review is prohibited by section
701(a)(1) when "statutes preclude judicial review,"" while section 701(a)(2)
prohibits review where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." The Court separated the two provisions by stating that section 701(a)(1)
prohibits review when the statutes involved expressly preclude reviev,2 while
section 701(a)(2) prohibits review when the statutes involved are drawn in
such broad terms that a court would have no meaningful standards to eval-
uate the agency's exercise of discretion for abuse.25
This construction of section 701(a)(2) is not new.26 It reflects the "no
law to apply" test which was contained in the legislative history of the APA. 27
16. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 827-28. Section 701(a)(2) reads: "This chapter ap-
plies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). Three questions
were actually appealed: whether the FDA had jurisdiction; if it did have jurisdiction,
whether review was available; and given review, whether there was an abuse of
discretion. The Court addressed only question two. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 827-28.
Justice Marshall would have disposed of the case by addressing question three and
finding no abuse. Id. at 854 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 828.
18. Citizens To Preserve Overland Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971) (quoting Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoL. L.
REv. 55 (1965)).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
20. 470 U.S. at 828.
21. Id. In addition to drawing a distinction between these two provisions of
the APA, the court discussed the conflict between sections 701(a)(2) and 706(2)(a).
This conflict is due to the fact that section 701(a)(2) prohibits review when an action
is committed to an agency's discretion, while section 706(2)(a) is a standard of review
which courts apply to determine if there is an abuse of discretion. The Court held
that section 701(a)(2) applies when there are no meaningful standards to evaluate the
agency's actions. In this class of cases, a court could not be qualified to apply the
section 706(2)(a) standard. 470 U.S. at 830. Section 706(2)(a) reads: "The reviewing
court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982).
23. Id. § 701(a)(2).
24. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.
25. Id.
26. Prior to Chaney, there was some confusion with respect to whether section
1986] 1041
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In addition, several courts have used this test in the past to determine whether
an agency's action is reviewable.2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
court of appeal's statement that the narrow construction of section 701(a)(2)
requires "a presumption of reviewability even to an agency's decision not to
undertake certain enforcement actions." 29 The Court, relying on a "tradi-
tion" of prosecutorial discretion, held that such decisions are presumptively
unreviewable.3 0
The foundation for the Court's presumption of unreviewability is the
recognition that an agency's decision not to use its enforcement powers in-
volves a "complicated balanc[e] of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within its expertise."'" This complicated balance includes an agency's devel-
opment of an overall policy of enforcement and the allocation of limited
resources among various enforcement opportunities to best effectuate that
policy.2 The Court held that without statutory guidance, these matters are
unreviewable because they fall within the expertise of the agency. Therefore,
a court would have no meaningful standards to use in applying an abuse of
discretion scope of review.33
In addition, the Court characterized nonenforcement decisions as pro-
secutorial in nature. The Court stated that nonenforcement decisions are
similar to decisions within the special province of the executive branch. 4 At
least by analogy, the Court suggested that the policy behind article II, section
701(a)(2) prevented review when there was "no law to apply" or only when there
was clear and convincing evidence of Congressional intent to foreclose review. See
K. DAvis, ADmINsTRATrv LAw TREATISE § 28.16, at 260 (Supp. 1982).
27. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
28. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S.
444, 445-56 (1979) (The Court, in using the "no law to apply" test, held that the
permissive language of the statutes involved expressed Congressional intent that the
ICC refusal to investigate was not reviewable.).
29. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. This Note will focus on the impact of Chaney
in the nonenforcement area. However, there is a possibility that Chaney will have
impact outside the nonenforcement area. While the Court draws on an analogy to
criminal prosecutorial discretion to support its presumption, there were indications
that all informal agency decisions not to act may come within the Court's presumption
of unreviewability. The Court, in its construction of section 701(a)(2), isolated the
"no law to apply" test from the legislative history which had been the foundation
of the presumption of reviewability. Id. at 834-35. By doing so, the Court may hold
in the future that the presumption of unreviewability is contained in section 701
(a)(2). Therefore, this presumption may apply outside the enforcement area. The
Court may have been alluding to this when it stated, "[t]hus, in establishing this
presumption in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free." Id. at 833.
30. Id. at 831.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 830-31.
34. Id. at 832.
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three, of the United States Constitution was applicable. 5 The agency, absent
guidelines provided by Congress, was charged with the responsibility to "take
[c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed." 3 6
Finally, the Court indicated that an agency's inaction does not provide
a focus for judicial review. 37 When an agency does not use its powers, it is
difficult to evaluate, absent guidelines, whether an agency exceeded its sta-
tutory authority.38 The Court also indicated that inaction does not create an
exigent need for judicial review because it is unlikely that an agency's inaction
would have a coercive impact on an individual's liberty or property rights. 39
In making a determination of whether a particular case is reviewable,
the Court stressed that the presumption of unreviewability could be rebutted
when the statutes involved provide a "guideline for the agency to follow in
exercising its enforcement powers," thereby, providing courts with law to
apply.40 The Court cited Dunlop v. Bachowski4 as a case involving a statute
which would provide law to apply.42 The Court, in discussing Dunlop, stated
that under 29 U.S.C. section 482(b) the Labor Secretary's decision not to
bring a civil action is reviewable because the statute contains mandatory
language which requires the Secretary to use the Department's enforcement
powers upon a finding of probable cause that a violation of the law occurred
during a union election.
43
35. Id. The Court stated: "Finally we recognize that an agency's refusal to
institute proceedings share to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch .... ." Id.
36. Id. (quoting U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 3).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 832-33.
39. Id. at 832.
40. Id. at 833.
41. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). In Dunlop, the plaintiff alleged that there had been
irregularities and violations of law in a union election he lost by 900 votes. The
plaintiff requested and received an investigation from the Secretary of Labor. How-
ever, the investigation did not result in prosecution. Id. at 562-63. The plaintiff sought
review of the Secretary's decision not to recommend prosecution on the grounds that
the investigation had substantiated the fact that there had been violations during the
election. Therefore, the Secretary's inaction was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 563-
64.
42. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833. The Court's discussion of Dunlop is significant
because it illustrates the "no law to apply" approach. However, Dunlop did not
follow this analysis. The Court felt compelled to revisit Dunlop because it had been
relied on by the FDA petititioners as a rejection of the prosecutorial discretion anal-
ogy. Id. In Dunlop, the Court took a broad approach weighing congressional intent,
the unavailability of other remedies, and the need for judicial review. See Dunlop,
421 U.S. 560; cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Mining Corp., 442 U.S. 444,
456-57 (1979) (pre-Chaney application of the "no law to apply" test).
43. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833. The critical language of 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) is:
"The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to
1986] 1043
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In Chaney the Court did not find such mandatory language. 44 In its
review of the statutes involved, the Court held that the decision by the FDA
not to use its enforcement powers was within the agency's discretion because
the statutes were framed in permissive terms and provide no guidelines or
conditions for their use.45 Therefore, absent some express indication that
Congress intended to limit the agency's discretion, the decision of the FDA
not to use its enforcement powers is unreviewable. 46
The emphasis the majority places on deference to an agency's expertise
in making nonenforcement decisions is strongly rooted in administrative law.47
The Court, in Moog Industries, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,4 8 used
such deference when it held that absent a patent abuse of discretion, an
agency's nonenforcement decisions should not be overturned. 49 In Moog the
petitioner requested the Court to postpone the enforcement of a Federal
Trade Commission cease-and-desist order until similar orders could be issued
against other firms in the industry.50 The Court denied petitioner's request.
In reaching its decision, the Court stated that only the Commission is com-
petent to determine both the extent of the relevant industry and whether the
competition within that industry is such that identical treatment of the entire
industry is required."'
believe that a violation of the subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied,
he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action
against the labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982). The Chaney court, in
finding mandatory language in this statute, stated that "[t]he statute quite clearly
withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for the exercise of its
enforcement power." Id. at 834.
44. 470 U.S. at 835. The Court in discussing the language of the statutes
involved stated that the general enforcement provision of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §
372 (1982), merely "authorized" investigations; unlike the statute in Dunlop it did
not make mandatory the use of its powers. Id. The remaining provisions failed to
provide law to rebut the presumption because the statutes did not set conditions which
would outline when the agency's enforcement powers should be used. In addition,
the statutes which did not contain mandatory terms were merely descriptions of the
sanctions available, rather than mandates to the agency to impose the sanctions in
every case. Id.
45. 470 U.S. at 835-36. The Court also rejected three additional arguments:
(1) The Court summarily rejected the FDA petitioner's argument that 21 U.S.C. §
352(0(2) (1982) (misbranding) and id. § 355 (new drugs) provide law to apply because
they were irrelevant. 470 U.S. at 835-36. (2) The Court rejected the use of a policy
statement attached to an unpromulgated rule as a source of law to rebut the pre-
sumption of unreviewability. Id. at 836. (3) The Court rejected FDA petitioner's
negative inference argument that because the statutes provide that the Secretary does
not have to report for prosecution minor violations, then the Secretary must report
major violations. Id. at 837.
46. Id. at 837-38.
47. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
48. 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
49. Id. at 414.
50. Id. at 411-12.
51. Id. at 413.
1044 [Vol. 51
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In both Moog and Chaney the Court expressed concern that judicial
review might interfere with the agency's use of its expertise to develop and
carry out its statutory mandate in the most efficient and economical way.
2
The degree of deference in these cases is justified upon the grounds that the
Court, without law to apply, cannot review an agency's informed judgment. 3
However, in neither Moog nor Chaney did the Court address the question
of whether review is available when the allegation that an agency abused its
discretion is based upon law outside the agency's enforcement statutes.
The distinction between reviewing an agency's informed judgment for
an abuse of discretion and reviewing an agency's decision to determine if it
is lawful is central to the position taken by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion.5 4 Justice Brennan presumed that Congress could not have intended
section 701(a)(2) to allow administrative agencies to ignore "clear jurisdic-
tional, regulatory, statutory, or constitutional commands." 55 While the pre-
sumption of unreviewability would limit review in the hundreds of mundane
cases agencies decide daily, Justice Brennan would allow review, for example,
in the four areas which the majority specifically left open or when it is clear
that an agency's decision was based entirely on "illegitimate reasons.
'5 6
The questions left unanswered by the majority are whether judicial re-
view will be available when 1) an agency claims that it is without jurisdiction,
2) an agency abdicates its statutory authority, 3) an agency refuses to enforce
a lawfully promulgated rule, or 4) an agency's inaction violates an individ-
52. Compare Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32 with Moog, 355 U.S. at 413.
53. See supra note 21'and accompanying text.
54. This distinction was drawn in Ness Inv. Corp. v. USDA, Forest Service,
512 F.2d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 1975). The court ruled that the decision by the Forest
Service not to issue a special permit to construct, operate, and maintain a resort on
federal parklands was a decision committed to the agency's discretion by law. Id.
However, the court stressed that federal courts do have jurisdiction to determine if
an agency has reached its decision in conformity with the law. Id. In Ness, the court
stated that when there is no law to apply, an individual's allegation that an agency
abused its discretion in making an informed judgment is unreviewable. Review is
available when an allegation of abuse of discretion involves a "violation by the agency
of constitutional, statutory, regulatory or other legal mandates." Id. This approach
is consistent with Justice Brennan's position in that it would allow review in essentially
the same areas, for the same reasons. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838-39 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
55. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. Review has been available on these grounds in the past. See Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S.
232 (1981). In SOCAL, it was alleged that the FTC issued a complaint because of
improper and irrelevant pressure from Congress, rather than a finding of "reason to
believe" there had been a violation. Id. at 1384. The court allowed review but set
strict parameters. The court ruled that if, on remand, the district court found that
the FTC issued the complaint based entirely on improper factors, then the Agency
did abuse its discretion. Id. at 1386. If the court found that it was based on both
proper and improper bases, then section 701(a)(2) would bar review. Id.
10451986]
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ual's constitutional rights.17 Review of lower court decisions prior to Chaney
indicates that courts are competent to use other sources of law to evaluate
an agency's nonenforcement decisions for an abuse of discretion.58 In ad-
dition, this prior case law demonstrates serious problems which can arise
absent judicial oversight.
The first question left open by the Court was whether an agency can
reject a request for agency action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
avoid judicial review. 9 Earlier cases have suggested that jurisdictional issues
are reviewable because they are questions of law.60 In National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Federal Power Commission,6' the
District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the rejection of a NAACP petition
requesting the Federal Power Commission to promulgate rules affecting the
employment practices of the industry it regulates. The Commission refused
to institute rulemaking proceedings on the grounds that it lacked jurisdic-
tion. 62 The court remanded the case to the Commission, holding that the
Commission does have limited jurisdiction to promulgate rules in this area.63
The court noted that it had considered only the question of jurisdiction and
not the Commission's considerable discretion to decide not to promulgate
rules."
The court's approach in NAACP further illustrates that a grant of ju-
risdiction to an agency carries with it a responsibility to consider the merits
of a petition when the subject matter of the petition is within the agency's
jurisdiction. This is consistent with Justice Brennan's position, in that he
argued that section 701(a)(2) was not intended by Congress to "set agencies
free to disregard legislative direction. ' 65 From this perspective, despite the
fact that nonenforcement decisions involve issues within the agency's discre-
57. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. The Chaney majority held that when there was no law to apply, the court
would have no guidelines to apply the abuse of discretion scope of review, 470 U.S.
at 830. Because these areas involve questions of law, such as construction of statutes
and the Constitution, courts have law to apply. If the majority's holding was given
a literal construction, these sources of law might be unavailable because they are not
explicitly contained within the enforcement statutes of an agency. See infra notes 128-
29 and accompanying text.
59. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
60. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
61. 520 F.2d 432, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
62. Id. at 433.
63. Id. at 446.
64. Id at 447 n.53; see also Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1981)
(the court held that although the substantive decision was committed to the absolute
discretion of the Commission, review was available to the extent that the Commis-
sion's decision violated its statutory mandate).
65. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority
opinion, 470 U.S. at 833).
1046 [Vol. 51
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tion, the determination of the parameters of an agency's statutory authority
is a question of law reviewable by the courts."
Permitting review of jurisdictional questions will also improve the quality
of information available to individuals seeking administrative action. 67 In
National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll,6" the
District of Columbia Circuit discussed this aspect of judicial review. In
NORML, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs rejected a petition
requesting that marijuana be declassified or reclassified to a lower schedule
of controlled substances.6 9 The Bureau rejected the petition, stating it was
not authorized to institute the rulemaking proceedings requested.70 The court
ruled that a more detailed refusal was required. The court criticized the
Bureau's rejection of the petition by stating, "It was not the kind of inter-
change and refinement of views that is the life-blood of a sound adminis-
trative process. ' 71 The court pointed out that a decision on the merits would
have informed the petitioners of their "alternative position[s] in the light of"
the Bureau's decision. 72 Allowing review of jurisdiction in agency nonen-
forcement cases will increase the availability of information and decrease the
likelihood that an agency will arbitrarily deny jurisdiction and avoid the
responsibility of providing a reasoned articulation.73
66. See SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 821 (1980) (In discussing this case, the court stated that the agency was required
to reconsider its decisions in light of the court's interpretation of law.); cf. Trans
Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 638 n.17 (1978) (discussion of limited
review of ICC use of its enforcement powers to determine if the ICC had gone beyond
its statutory authority where the decision of whether to use its powers was not re-
viewable).
67. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
68. 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 656.
70. Id. at 659.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. By allowting review in this area, a court will be able to enforce a basic
principle of administrative law-an agency must make the correct decision for the
correct reason. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). The relationship
between the Chenery principle and an agency's informal decision is discussed in K.
DAvis, supra note 26, §§ 16.00-.09, at 90. Professor Davis indicates a need to develop
a stronger law requiring agencies to give reasons for their informal findings. He cited
with approval an approach taken in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591
F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978). He quoted the following language from Matlovich which
explains the importance of this type of information.
The fundamental principle of reasoned explanation ... serves at least
three interrelated purposes: enabling the court to give proper review to the
administrative determination; helping to keep the administrative agency within
proper authority and discretion, as well as helping to avoid and prevent
arbitrary, discriminatory, and irrational action by the agency; and informing
the aggrieved person of the grounds of the administrative action so that he
10471986]
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The second question left open by the court presents an issue of statutory
abdication. 74 In reserving this question, the Court stated that in statutory
abdication "situations the statute conferring authority on the agency might
indicate that such decisions were not 'committed to agency discretion.' ' 75
The Court may be referring to the fact that in the past courts have resolved
these statutory abdication cases by applying a broad form of the "no law
to apply" test.76 The courts have examined the statutes and legislative history
to determine if Congress, in passing the statutes, intended to have the pro-
gram implemented or if Congress simply intended to create a tool the agency
could use at its discretion. 77
When Congress passes legislation which creates a program that they
desire to have implemented, then an agency's decision not to implement the
program is not an act of discretion, but a violation of law.78 In Allison v.
Block,79 the Eighth Circuit held that although the statute conferred discretion
on the Secretary of Agriculture in individual cases, the Secretary must provide
notice to the farmers that a new program is available and must promulgate
procedures to implement the program. In Allison, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture argued that a statute authorizing a foreclosure-deferral program merely
created an additional power to be used at his discretion.80 The appellate court
rejected the Secretary's argument that the program was a tool which the
Secretary could "keep in his back pocket."8 The court in Allison found law
to apply in the legislative history which indicated not only an intent to actively
help the farmers, but also referred to methods used in other programs which
might be utilized to implement the foreclosure-deferral program.8 2
In contrast, in Rank v. Nimmo the Ninth Circuit held that Congress
had inteneded to create a discretionary tool when it passed the statute in-
can plan his course of action (including the seeking of judicial review).
K. DAvis, supra note 26, § 16.00, at 93 (quoting Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 857).
74. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
75. Id. Based on the facts of the Chaney case, the Court stated that it did
not "have a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has con-
sciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to
an abdication of its statutory responsibilities." Id.
76. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983).
78. See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In
Adams, the court used a broad approach in determining Congressional intent that
the Secretary of HEW withhold funds from school districts that did not comply with
a voluntary desegregation program. Failure to deprive funds was found to be a
dereliction of duty. Id. at 1163-66.
79. 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983).
80. Id. at 635.
81. Id. at 634.
82. Id. at 634-35.
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volved.8 3 The court stated that nothing in the legislative history of the as-
signment-refunding options4 indicated that Congress intended to require the
Veterans Administration (VA) to implement the programA5 The court decided
that the absence of both standards and procedures indicated that the decision
to implement the program was within the discretion of the Administrator. 6
If the presumption of unreviewability is applied to the statutory abdi-
cation area, its primary impact may be to require a more persuasive showing
of congressional intent to enable review. However, in State of Iowa ex rel.
Miller v. Block,87 the Eighth Circuit did not apply the presumption of un-
reviewability. Instead the court distinguished Chaney as applying only when
an agency refuses aid to a single individual.88 The Iowa case involved the
refusal of the Secretary of Agriculture to implement several disaster relief
programs. The court followed the approach of Allison v. Block in holding
that the Secretary's refusal to implement these programs was reviewable 9
Regardless of whether the presumption of unreviewability applies, here again,
the issue is one of statutory interpretation which falls within the expertise of
the court.
Whether an agency's lawfully promulgated rules provide law to apply
which can rebut the presumption of unreviewability is the third question left
open by the Court.9 The Chaney Court, in its construction of the "no law
to apply" test, implied that "law" is synonymous with "statute," but stopped
short of saying that a statute is the only source of authority to rebut the
presumption of unreviewability.91
83. 677 F.2d 692, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982). The case
is useful for discussion here because the court followed the statutory abdication
analysis and reached the conclusion that the statutes created a discretionary tool.
However, the case may be of limited precedental value because review might have
been precluded by 38 U.S.C. § 211 (1982). Therefore, the court should never have
reached the issue of statutory abdication. This statute is the general VA preclusion
statute which limits the jurisdiction of courts to review decisions of administrators
"on any question of law or fact under any law providing benefits for veterans." Id.
Despite this problem, courts have cited and discussed Rank favorably. See, e.g.,
Mopa Band of Paiute Indian v. United States Dept. of Interior, 747 F.2d 563, 565
(9th Cir. 1984); Allison, 723 F.2d at 636.
84. The assignment-refunding option authorized the VA to pay off a loan
prior to foreclosure and receive assignment. Rank, 677 F.2d at 699.
85. Id. at 700.
86. Id. In addition to the legislative history, the court noted that the lack of
standards made it difficult to conduct an abuse of discretion review. The VA decision
involved various policy considerations internal to the management of the VA. Id.
87. 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 350 n.2.
89. Id. at 355.
90. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 836. In reserving this question, the Court rejected
respondents' argument that a policy statement attached to an unpromulgated rule
could supply law to rebut the presumption of unreviewability. Id.
91. Id. at 830-36.
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In the past, an agency's lawfully promulgated rules (regulations) have
sometimes been used to declare the agency's actions illegal. 92 In Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 93 the question presented to the Court was whether a dismissal was
ineffective because the Department of Interior failed to comply with its own
regulations granting employees procedural rights beyond those granted by
statute in termination decisions.9 4 The Court held that the Department was
bound by its rules,95 and that the dismissal was illegal because it fell sub-
stantially short of the Department's regulations.9 6 Justice Frankfurter, writing
a concurring opinion, explained the policy behind the decision: "An executive
agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its
action to be judged." '97
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy," the Court
addressed the question of whether an agency's rules could limit its discretion
in enforcement decisions. In Accardi the Attorney General promulgated a
regulation vesting a board with the discretion to determine whether an alien's
application for suspension of deportation should be approved. 99 The Attorney
General announced at a press conference that he was going to deport a
hundred people whose names appeared on a list.' °° The Court was concerned
that the Board's knowlege that the petitioner's name appeared on the At-
torney General's list prevented the Board from using its independent judg-
ment.'0' The Court, finding that so long as the regulation is in effect, "it
has the force of law,'1 0 2 remanded the case with instructions to determine
whether the Board had exercised its discretion as the regulation required or
had simply deferred to the influence of the Attorney General.? 3 Accardi
stands for the proposition that an agency's lawfully promulgated rules have
the force of law which can limit an agency's discretion in the enforcement
area.104
92. See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
93. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
94. Id. at 536-46.
95. Id. at 546.
96. Id. at 545.
97. Id. at 546.
98. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
99. Id. at 265-66.
100. Id. at 264.
101. Id. at 264-65.
102. Id. at 265.
103. Id. at 268.
104. Id. The Accardi case was heard a second time by the Court. Shaunessy
v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1954). On remand of the earlier case,
the District Court held that the Board had used its independent judgment; therefore,
the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed. Id. at 282. The appellate court reversed the
finding that the Attorney General's statements had "unconsciously" influenced the
Board. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the appeals court,
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The relationship between section 701(a)(2) and an agency's lawfully pro-
mulgated rules was directly addressed in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaf-
fer.105 In Shaffer, the District of Columbia Circuit held that regulations of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding procurement had the
force of law, thereby limiting the FAA's discretion in awarding contracts. 16
The court held that once the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that
the agency had violated its regulations, the agency could not claim that the
issue had been committed to its discretion by law. 17 The court, discussing
administrative discretion in general, stated, "When the bounds of discretion
give way to the stricter boundaries of law, administrative discretion gives
way to judicial review."' 08
If an agency's rules outline situations in which the rules mandate that
an agency use its enforcement powers, it seems likely that this will provide
law to rebut the presumption of unreviewability. If, as in Shaffer, a plaintiff
can demonstrate that the agency's action is contrary to a rule which has the
force of law, the court is competent to review because the agency has pre-
viously limited its discretion.? 9 If a court were to take the opposite position,
an agency could effectively ignore its own rules, affording no notice to
interested parties who might rely on the agency's rules to their detriment." 0
The final question left open by the Court is whether review is precluded
when an agency's action violates an individual's constitutional rights."' In
Johnson v. Robison,'2 the Court addressed the question of whether Con-
gress, by statute, can preclude review of constitutional issues. In Johnson
Congress precluded judicial review in legislation which provided veterans'
educational benefits.' 3 A conscientious objector appealed a denial of benefit
by the Veteran's Administration to the Court on constitutional grounds." 4
105. 424 F.2d 859, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
106. Id. at 874.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. If an agency's rules are mere descriptions of sanctions, rather than at-
tempts by an agency to limit its discretion, then there will be no law to apply. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 679
(1985). This point is similar to the position taken by Chaney with respect to the
different impact of statutes. Statutes which condition agency enforcement powers
provide law and those which merely describe sanctions do not. See supra notes 44-
45 and accompanying text.
110. In addition to the fact that rules have the force of law, they cannot be
revoked without some of the same procedures which were used to promulgate them.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 436 U.S. 29 (1983)
(case presented question of whether the Department of Transportation violated the
APA by rescinding a passive occupant restraint rule).
111. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838.
112. 415 U.S. 361 (1973).
113. Id. at 366.
114. Id. at 365.
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The Court held that Congress could not have intended to prevent review of
constitutional issues, or the constitutionality of the preclusion statute would
be in question." 5
The question of whether Congress, in remaining silent with respect to
judicial review, can limit review of constitutional issues was addressed in
Estep v. United States.16 In Estep, local boards were charged with classifying
individuals as to their availability for military service. They had refused to
grant exemptions to individuals who claimed to be exempt from the service
because, as Jehovah's Witnesses, they were ministers of religion." 7 The stat-
utes had not provided for judicial review of the local boards' decisions."'
Consequently, during enforcement proceedings, the district courts refused to
review the local boards' decisions." 9 The Supreme Court ruled that in the
enforcement hearings the individuals had a right to raise the issue of juris-
diction. 20 The Court noted that Congress may limit the availability of judicial
review by remaining silent.'2' The denial of power to the courts depends upon
the whole setting of the statutes involved and the scheme of regulations which
is adopted.'2 However,.the Court indicated that the power of Congress to
prevent review is limited "when the Constitution requires [review]."' '
The proposition that the Constitution is a source of law which will rebut
the presumption of unreviewability appears to be settled. 24 In Johnson, the
court held that Congress could not limit the Court's jurisdiction to hear
constitutional issues by an unequivocal statute precluding review.125 In Estep,
the court stated that even when Congress is silent, review may be constitu-
tionally required. 26 It follows that Congress cannot limit judicial review of
constitutional issues by drafting enforcement statutes in permissive terms. In
this area, the courts are competent to review because they have law to apply.
115. Id. at 367.
116. 327 U.S. 114 (1945).
117. Id. at 116-17.
118. Id. at 119.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 122. "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached
only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which [the board] gave the
registrant." Id.
121. Id. at 119.
122. Id. at 120.
123. Id.
124. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text; see also Marbury v. Mad-
ison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-79 (1803) ("If a law be in opposition to the Con-
stitution ... the court must determine which of these rules governs the case. This is
of the very essence of ... judicial duty."). See generally, Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 H.Av.
L. REv. 1362, 1387 (1953) ("If the court finds that what is being done is invalid, its
duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional limitation invalid.").
125. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1973).
126. 327 U.S. at 120.
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The source is the United States Constitution which, in order to maintain our
form of government, must prevail over all other law. 27
The answers to the questions left open by the Chaney Court will deter-
mine, in part, the impact of the case. If the majority's holding is literally
construed, review in the previously discussed areas may be foreclosed because
these sources of law are not explicitly included within an agency's enforce-
ment statutes.'2 This outcome is undesirable because it would result in an
unacceptable degree of abdication by the Court of the judiciary's oversight
responsibility. Justice Brennan's approach, on the other hand, would allow
the judiciary to continue in its oversight role while promoting the policy
considerations advanced by the majority to support the presumption of un-
reviewability. 29
One reason the majority cited for holding an agency's nonenforcement
decision presumptively unreviewable was that these decisions involve a com-
plicated balance of factors within the expertise of an agency. 30 This justi-
fication for the presumption of unreviewability should not prevent review
where the issues involve questions of law which are ultimately within the
expertise of a court.13 1 Past case law indicates that a distinction can be drawn
between an unreviewable agency decision involving an agency's expertise and
a reviewable agency decision that is within its expertise but outside the law. 3 2
If the presumption of unreviewability can be rebutted by a threshold showing
that an agency's nonenforcement decision is outside some implicit source of
law, then this distinction will be a part of the rebuttable presumption of
unreviewability.133 Therefore, the presumption will provide sufficient flexi-
127. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179.
128. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837-38. It is likely that the number of questions left
open by the Court is some indication that review will be available in at least some
of these areas. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 675.
129. With respect to oversight, Justice Brennan's approach will allow courts
to review an agency's assertion that it lacks jurisdiction. See supra notes 59-73 and
accompanying text. This approach will also allow a court in statutory abdication cases
to require agencies to carry out the intent of Congress. See infra notes 74-89 and
accompanying text. In addition, a court will be able to require agencies to adhere to
the positions they take in lawfully promulgated rules. See supra notes 90-115 and
accompanying text. Finally, a court will be able to review an agency's inaction to
determine if that inaction violates an individual's constitutional rights. See supra
notes 111-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of judicial review when an
agency's nonenforcement decision is based on an entirely illegitimate reason, see supra
note 56 and accompanying text. With respect to Justice Brennan's approach pro-
moting the policy considerations advanced by the majority, see infra notes 130-47
and accompanying text.
130. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
131. See supra 59-137 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
133. The concept that the availability of judicial review should be conditioned
upon a threshold showing that an agency has violated some law is discussed in
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bility to assure that a court can continue to have oversight to enforce reg-
ulatory, statutory, and constitutional laws, while maintaining a proper degree
of deference to an agency's expertise.13 4
The majority suggested that the separation of powers concept embodied
in article II, section 3, of the United States Constitution provides an addi-
tional reason for creating the presumption of unreviewability.'3 5 When a court
is faced with a nonenforcement decision and no law to apply, the court is
not competent to apply an abuse of discretion scope of review. 13 6 Absent
some source of guidelines to aid a court in evaluating an agency's nonen-
forcement decision, the court would be substituting its judgment for that of
the agency, violating the separation of powers doctrine. 37 While this concern
may support the creation of the presumption of unreviewability, it does not
support the limitation of the source of law to rebut the presumption to only
explicit guidelines within an agency's enforcement statutes. If this were the
only source of law, then it would place administrative agencies above the
judiciary, and also above the Constitution. 38 Justice Brennan's approach
provides for deference to an agency when there is no law to apply, yet allows
the courts to carry out their responsibilities to review the actions of admin-
istrative agencies to ensure they are within the laws.
The majority also discussed the fact that agency inaction fails to provide
a sufficient focus for judicial review. 39 Nonenforcement decisions, by their
informal nature, involve an abbreviated administrative record.140 The abbre-
Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of Committed to Agency Dis-
cretion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 367 (1968).
134, The reviewable issues under Justice Brennan's approach are questions of
law which are within the expertise of a reviewing court. See supra note 129; see also
Saferstein, supra note 133, at 383 ("Where expertise is an important factor in de-
termining general nonreviewability, a court can nevertheless carve out areas where
expertise is not required.").
135. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
136. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
137. Section 701(a)(2) prohibits review when there is no law to apply. This, at
least by analogy, is the same rationale behind one aspect of the political question
doctrine in that the doctrine prevents judicial review when there are no "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" to apply. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962). In administrative law, the need to withhold review because of separation
of power concerns has been greatly reduced by "the rise of a number of strategies
by which courts might review the exercise of discretion without usurping the executive
function. Courts may require explanations for decisions, and in reviewing those ex-
planations, they may be quite deferential." Sunstein, supra note 109, at 671 (footnotes
omitted), For cases demonstrating these "stategies," see infra note 144.
138. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein, note
109, at 670 ("The 'take care' clause is a duty, not a license.").
139. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
140. When individuals request an agency to take on a task, section 555(e)
requires that "prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a
1054 [Vol. 51
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viated record would, to some extent, magnify the court's lack of competence
to apply the abuse of discretion scope of review. 141 There are, however,
methods at a court's disposal to contend with this problem.1 42 While review
may be impractical if the court is without law to apply, when there is law
to apply, a court would have guidelines to evaluate what record exists. 43 In
addition, the court would have a sufficient focus to make a meaningful
request for additional information from the agency or to evaluate the tes-
timony of the decision-maker. 44 Regardless of whether this law comes from
explicit or implicit sources, the court should be equally competent to apply
an abuse of discretion scope of review.
Finally, the majority's statement that inaction is less likely to have a
coercive impact is a weak justification for any presumption against review-
ability. 45 This is particularly true of a literal construction of the majority's
holding. If the source of lav was limited to explicit guidelines within the
statutes, then the availability of review would depend upon Congressional
selection of statutory language, rather than the facts of the case.146 Using
Justice Brennan's approach and rebutting the presumption from implicit
sources would at least allow review in factually-compelling cases.
The majority and Justice Brennan may differ with respect to the source
of law which will rebut the presumption of unreviewability. However, both
agree that the institutional needs of administrative agencies are sufficiently
written application, petition, or other request of an intersted person made in con-
nection with any agency proceeding." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1982). This type of notice,
along with the request, is likely to be the only "record" a court would review to
determine if there was an abuse of discretion.
141. The Court did not explain why inaction fails to provide a focus for judicial
review. The Court merely stated that agency action does provide a sufficient focus
for review. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. The availability of review is conditioned upon
the existence of law to apply, rather than agency action. Therefore, this discussion
is centered on the single greatest variable which the existence of law will affect-a
court's competence to review the record.
142. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overland Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971) (informal decision to build a highway through a park); Camp, Controller
of the Currency v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 139 (1973) (informal decision not to issue a national
bank charter).
143. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
144. Traditionally, courts have disliked ad hoc explanations and exposing the
decision-maker to questioning. Nevertheless, due to necessity they have abandoned
these constraints in cases involving informal decision-making. See, e.g., Citizens to
Preserve Overland Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (informal decision to
build a highway through a park); Camp, Controller of the Currency v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138 (1973) (informal decision not to issue a national bank charter).
145. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
146. Professor Davis advanced the question of whether Congress, when draft-
ing statutes, has judicial review in mind and makes a deliberate choice between
permissive and mandatory language. K. DAvis, supra, note 26, at 251.
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important to justify a presumption of unreviewability. 147 In contrast, Justice
Marshall rejected the creation of the presumption of unreviewability. 148 Al-
though he acknowledged that a degree of deference must be given to an
agency's expertise, he placed greater emphasis on the rights of the individual
and the importance of the judiciary's role in maintaining these rights. 149
Justice Marshall, in his opinion concurring in judgment only, challenged
the Court's creation of a rebuttable presumption of unreviewability as bad
law.150 Justice Marshall characterized agency inaction as a "pressing problem
of the modern administrative state, given the enormous powers, for both
good and ill, that agency inaction, like agency action, holds over citizens."'-'
Marshall argued that the Court's break with tradition would bind the hands
of the courts to deal with these pressing problemsY.1 2 Justice Marshall rejected
the notion that the tradition of prosecutorial discretion is sufficiently strong
to form a basis for the presumption of unreviewability 53 He suggested that
the Court's holding gives too much discretion to an agency and not enough
flexibility to the courts to deal with administrative lawlessness. 5 4
Justice Marshall argued that Justice Brennan's position did not mitigate
the impact of the Court's holding, but rather magnified the problems it
created. Justice Marshall pointed out that if the Court's decision is given its
literal meaning, these four areas will be unreviewable when the presumption
is not rebutted.5 5 Alternatively, he argued that, if the Court allows review
147. This position can be demonstrated by the importance the majority places
on allowing an agency to allocate its limited resources among various enforcement
opportunities. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32. Justice Brennan, in support of the general
presumption, stated that "in the normal course of events, Congress intends to allow
broad discretion for its administrative agencies to make particular enforcement de-
cisions .... ." Id. at 838 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 840-41 (Marshall, J., concurring).
149. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
150. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 840-41 (Marshall, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
153. Justice Marshall's discussion of prosecutorial discretion focuses on the
fact that prosecutorial discretion in criminal law or administrative law is not absolute.
Id. at 846-48 (Marshall, J., concurring). The case law supports Marshall's position.
See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1973) ("Due process of law requires
... vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina's two tiered appellate process
.... [T]herefore ... it was not constitutionall] ... for the state to respond to
Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge
... ."). While prosecutorial discretion has been constitutionally limited when the
"prosecutor" has taken action, this limit may be ineffective when the "prosecutor-
administrator" does not act. See K. DAvis, supra note 26, § 28.00, at 251 (discussion
on selective enforcement), cf. St. Martin's Press v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.
1979) ("The choice between prosecuting and not prosecuting is entirely within the
discretion of a district attorney.").
154. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 848 (Marshall, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 854 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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in these areas without rebutting the presumption, courts will be deciding
cases on their merits, rendering meaningless the presumption of unreviewa-
bility. 15 6
Justice Marshall would allow review of an agency's refusal to take an
enforcement action absent "clear and convincing congressional intent to the
contrary, giving deference to the agency's expertise."'15 7 On the facts of this
case, Justice Marshall would have allowed review and would have reversed
the appellate court on the grounds that there was nothing to suggest that an
abuse of discretion occurred.'
The conflict between Justice Marshall's concern for individual rights and
the majority's concern for deference to an agency's expertise is at the center
of the tension surrounding section 701(a)(2). 159 Justice Marshall's approach
would render section 701(a)(2) useless and place individual rights above ad-
ministrative agencies' need to be shielded from meaningless and expensive
review.' 60 The opposite approach, which would allow only explicit sources
of law to rebut the presumption of unreviewability in section 701(a)(2) would
place the needs of administrative agencies above the rights of individuals.'6'
Justice Brennan's approach of allowing the presumption of unreviewability
to be rebutted by implicit sources of law provides the best balance of indi-
vidual rights and agency needs.
156. Id. at 854 (Marshall, J., concurring).
157. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 853-54 (Marshall, J., concurring).
159. This tension was the focus of a series of articles, some of which are Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoLuhi. L. REv. 55 (1965);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L. REV.
965 (1969); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Alway Reviewable, 51 MI-N.
L. REv. 643 (1967); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 814 (1966). The articles deal with the question of whether an arbitrary agency
action could be unreviewable because of section 701(a)(2).
160. Justice Marshall's approach fails to draw a distinction between sections
701(a)(1) and 701(a)(2). His approach would arguably permit review in all cases not
involving an express congressional bar to review. Beyond the increased cost to the
agency in defending its decisions not to act more frequently, one commentator sug-
gests that unlimited review of administrative agencies' nonenforcement decisions may
cause the formalization of informal decisions in order to facilitate judicial review.
This formalization would result in an increase in cost and a decrease in efficiency.
See Sunstein, supra note 109, at 673.
161. This approach would result in an unnecessary reduction of the judiciary's
power of oversight. Justice Brennan's approach would shield an agency from the
burdens of meaningless review, which could result in increased cost and a reduction
in the efficiency of administrative agencies. See Saferstein, supra note 133, at 319
("Mr. Saferstein ... would have the courts consider more fully the possibilities of
partial review, limited to those issues which could be examined without excessive cost
to the institutions involved.").
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The Chaney decision, by addressing section 701(a)(2) in detail, has laid
the foundation for a more consistent analysis for dealing with the question
of reviewability in agency inaction cases. The impact of Chaney will depend
upon whether review will be available when the source of law to rebut the
presumption of unreviewability comes from outside an agency's enforcement
statutes. By expanding the source of law to include regulations, statutes, and
the Constitution, courts will be able to assure that an agency's exercise of
discretion is within the law. In addition, the courts will be able to maintain
a proper degree of deference to an agency's expertise while providing needed
review to protect individual rights.
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